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Abstract: Risk management of a hydro power plant has been analysed from fracture mechanics point of view. The research is focused on the risk and integrity assessment 
of pressure equipment in a reversible hydro power plant in order to determine to what extent it poses a risk to Bajina Basta settlement and its inhabitants. The risk matrix 
has been used to assess risk level according to probability and consequence in a more descriptive way, whereas the failure assessment diagram has been used as an 
alternative engineering approach, including level II analysis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The improvement of electricity production and 
distribution introduced broader use of electricity, of which 
industrial use is the most prominent in relation to the general 
social development. The process of industrialization and 
influx of population triggered urban development, reflected 
in domain of economy, urban structure and urban activities, 
structure of population and quality of life. Electrification 
includes building of electric power plants based on diverse 
sources of primary energy used in process of electric energy 
production. Although their basic purpose is electrical energy 
production, being a complex system of specific functions, 
these power stations perform great impact on surrounding 
local area, [1]. Growing need for electrical energy, initiated 
building of power stations on bigger and bigger scale, not 
only in size, but also with increasing complexity. In that 
respect the risk degree and the possibility of technical 
equipment malfunction increase, as well as the scope of 
impact on surrounding area. This is the reason that in parallel 
with exploitation of power plant it is necessary to carry out 
continuous evaluation of possible extraordinary events and 
their consequences, as well as to define procedures for 
prevention of all negative effects. In order to minimize the 
risk of threatening the surrounding due to the irregularities 
in work process, it is necessary to carry out extensive 
maintenance of all technical systems of power plant, which 
implies constant monitoring of structural integrity and life of 
technical equipment involved in production process, 
regardless of the fact if it is in process of active use or not. 
The checkout of equipment condition implies periodical trial 
workstate, visual inspections and examination with non-
destructive methods, including consultations with experts 
and specialized institutions.  
As a consequence of industrialization, due to enlarged 
availability of electric power, economic and social develop-
ment of Bajina Basta settlement went on in parallel with the 
opening of Hydro Power Plant (HPP) 'Bajina Bašta' in 1966 
and its expansion, Reversible HPP (RHPP) in 1982. Taking 
into account possible negative consequences in the case of 
unwanted event, the highest impact level is related to 
integrity of the dam, drainage and pipelines and pressure 
vessels, as well as evacuation systems – (overflow) safety 
floodgate and foundation outlets. The rupture of the RHPP 
pipeline would cause water overflow of the surge hub in the 
surrounding area, escarpments of the nearby terrain and the 
collapse of the entire facility and local communications, 
which would be fatal for the local surrounding area. There 
are also irregularities in power plant exploitation and 
structure integrity malfunctions that do not cause severe 
consequences, as notable long-term damage of the 
environment, but due to their significantly higher frequency 
this should be as well the subject of constant examination 
and supervision. The broader scope of this research is the 
influence of RHPP, as a part of HPP Bajina Bašta on the 
development of Bajina Bašta settlement in terms of 
jeopardizing local surroundings and its inhabitants in case of 
realization of an unwanted event. In this paper, the research 
is focused on the risk and integrity assessment of pressure 
equipment in RHPP and strives to determine to what extent 
RHPP poses a threat to Bajina Basta settlement and its 
inhabitants. Toward this end, the fracture mechanics 
approach has been used to assess structural integrity of the 
RHPP, i.e. its most critical components, like pressure vessels 
for air storage. Having in mind relatively simple geometry, 
so-called engineering approach has been used, including the 
risk matrix analysis, [2-4]  
 
2 HPP BAJINA BASTA – GENERAL DESCRIPTION [3, 4] 
 
Reversable HPP "Bajina Bašta" operates within the HPP 
"Bajina Basta", Fig. 1, and represents the expansion of the 
existing plant, thus enhancing the energy characteristics of 
HPP "Bajina Basta" to the extent that they create a new 
modified plant with a very high flexibility, a high guaranteed 
power and a large amount of accumulated energy from 
hydroelectric power station. In order to fulfil all the above-
mentioned requirements, RHPP "Bajina Basta" must be 
always ready for operation. This means that at all times its 
generators must be technically ready for shifting to pump or 
generator operating modes, depending on the requirements 
of the Electric Power System. 
The upper accumulation of the RHPP "Bajina Bašta" 
has very small tributaries that are naturally filled so that its 
operation depends on the operation of the pumps, that is, the 
operation of the generators in the pumping mode, which 
replaces the upper accumulation to later obtain electricity 
from the generating mode of the generator. 
Because of the high power of the 310 MW generator in 
the pumping mode, it is not possible to start the unit in the 
usual way of pumping the pumps. The generator is started 
by a synchronous "back to back" method. This means that it 
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is powered by a generator of 105 MW from the old HPP 
"Bajina Bašta". Since the generator has 3 times less power 
than the RHE pump that starts in the pump direction, it is 
necessary to create conditions for this start-up. The main 
condition is to push the water from the reversible aggregate 
impeller by blowing in air under pressure which must be 
available with a given volume and pressure at any moment. 
 
 
Figure 1 Upper and lower accumulation and inlet-outlet system of hydro power plant "Bajina Bašta" [5] 
 
During the first internal examinations, spot corrosion 
was noticed on the interior surfaces of the tank No. 970 in 
which the compressor pressure tube was directly placed. 
The cause of corrosion is probably a compressed air system 
that enters a tank at a temperature of 50 °C and contains 
moisture from the air and acid caused by decomposition 
and combustion of the lubricating oil for the compressor 
during compression. Radiographic testing of welded joints 
was performed, finding unacceptable welding defects, [6, 
7]. To obtain a permit for further use of the reservoir, it was 
necessary to hire a competent Institution to perform 
structural integrity. This was done by the University of 
Belgrade, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, using the 
basic laws of fracture mechanics. Based on that report, the 
inspector signed the permission for further use of the tank 
with the recommendation to monitor the errors during 
periodic inspection of the equipment under pressure.  
When observing the probability of an unwanted event, 
in this case, an explosion of compressed air reservoirs, 
what is noted is the intensity of possible consequences for 
the people, property, environment and reputation of the 
company. In the suggested model, we proposed a combi–
nation of qualitative and quantitative approach to the 
assessment of potential consequences, as given in Tab. 1 in 
the form of risk matrix, [7]. 
At the time of the explosion, everybody in the room 
would be affected by air strike, some probably fatally. 
Compressor control equipment, and partly compressors, 
would be destroyed, as well as the part of the equipment for 
regulation and management of the hydro-aggregate R1, 
which is separated from the compressor station only by the 
overhaul door, which would be removed by force and 
thrown to the controller of the generator R1 due to the 
pressure in the room. Indirect damage would be the cost of 
total stoppage of RHPP, which is 180 K€/hour, taking into 
account the maximum load capacity at the price of KWh in 
europeak regime. After a breakdown, the power plant would 
not be able to operate in a pumping direction, which means 
that the undamaged generator R2 could only discharge the 
accumulated contents of the upper accumulation to a 
technical minimum, operating in the generator direction. 
Pumping would be disabled due to the lack of air pressure to 
start the pump unit, and without the pump there is no 
accumulation charging, or later generator operation. 
The time for replacing the existing two reservoirs with 
three smaller tanks of a total volume of 3×9 m3 would be 
minimum one month with previous thorough preparation of 
all transport details. Knowing that design and construction 
of new reservoirs lasts approximately one year, it is 
necessary to purchase three new reservoirs, as soon as 
possible, enabling urgent replacement if the analysis using 
fracture mechanics shows further inapplicability. 
In accordance with risk analysis demonstrated here, 
the following was concluded, [4]:  
Ivana VUČETIĆ et al.: Risk Management of a Hydro Power Plant – Fracture Mechanics Approach 
430                                                                                                                                                                                                          Technical Gazette 26, 2(2019), 428-432 
-  Frequency estimation: there are incidents registered in 
relation to the explosion of pressure tank worldwide - 
B - low risk level. 
- Potential harmful consequences for people: it is 
possible for someone to get seriously injured or killed 
- 5B - medium risk level. 
-  Potential endangering impact on the environment is 
not registered - 1B - no risk. 
- Potential damage to a company’s reputation is 
estimated as 4B - medium risk level. 
 
The overall risk level is defined as the highest 
registered risk level which in this case study amounts to 5B 
(concerning people and property). 
According to estimation of potential consequences of 
the unwanted event on the local surrounding area and its 
inhabitants, the case study demonstrated no impact on 
environment, but registered potential harmful impact of 
middle level risk degree on people’s life and health and 
economy development related to damage to a company 
reputation. RHPP is a multiplex system, which consists of 
high-risk pressure equipment. 
Anyhow, the aforementioned approach is a bit more 
descriptive than engineering. Therefore, now we introduce 
a special procedure for risk analysis, based on fracture 
mechanics concept, [8-11]. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive risk matrix, taken from [2] 
 
Potential consequences Event frequency 
People Property Environment Reputation A B C D E Negligible Low Moderate Medium Large 
0 No injuries No losses No damage No harm      
1 Insignificant injuries 
Loss up to 
10 K€ 







     
2 Minor injuries 
Loss from 
180 K€ to 
540 K€ 
Minor consequence 





There is a concern 
at the local level. 
 
 
   
3 Serious injuries 
Loss from 








There is a concern 





4 Permanent incapability 
Loss from 









There is a concern 
at the national 
level. 
    
 
5 Death Loss over  50 M€ 
Dire consequences. 





reaction at the 
international level. 
     
3 FAILURE ASSESSMENT DIAGRAM  
 
Starting point in this analysis is the Failure Assessment 
Diagramme (FAD), as shown in Fig. 2. The FAD is based 
on simultaneous consideration of brittle fracture and plastic 
collapse, as to major mechanisms of failure of statically 
loaded steel structures, such as pressure vessels. Both 
failure mechanisms are represented as non-dimensional 
ratios of working parameters and material properties. In the 
case of brittle fracture, it is the ratio between stress 
intensity factor and fracture toughness, Kr = KI/KIc, whereas 
in the case of plastic collapse it is the ratio between net 
stress and critical stress, Sr = Sn/Sc. Once these ratios are 
calculated, one can position the point on a diagram, which 
can be inside the safe area, or outside it, Fig. 2. The limit 









  =     
                                        (1) 
 
Figure 2 Failure assessment diagramme, [9], modified according to 
delamination (shifted points 1 and 4, as marked in Tab. 2) 
 
This, classical fracture mechanics approach, has been 
used recently to estimate risk probability, [8-11], based on 
simple reasoning that the closer the point is to the limit 
curve the larger is the probability of failure. This approach 
was applied successfully in several cases of pressure 
vessels with detected cracks, including Pressure Vessels in 
RHPP BB, as shown in Fig. 2, taken basically from [9], but 
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without shifted points: (0.15, 0.92) to (0.6, 0.92), and (0.22, 
0.74) to (0.88, 0.74). These points basically took into 
account effects of residual stress (RS) and hydrostatic 
probe pressure ("over-pressure" - OP), as given in Tab. 2 
and explained in [9], with additional shift due to 
delamination, the phenomenon explained in [13].  
 
Table 2 Values for probabilities, [9] 
Point No. Point Coord.  (x; y) 
KI 
MPa√mm Kr=KI/KIc
* Sn=pR/2t MPa Sr=Sn/Sc
* Pfm 
1. Crack with double length and RS (0,15; 0,92) 1469 0,93 87 0,15 0,94 
2. Crack with real length and RS (0,15; 0,65) 1038 0,66 87 0,15 0,70 
3. Crack with real length without RS (0,15; 0,22) 345 0,22 87 0,15 0,24 
4. Crack with real length with RS withOP (0,22; 0,74) 1186 0,74 124 0,21 0,84 
5. Crack with real length without RS with OP (0,22; 0,31) 493 0.31 124 0,21 0,33 
As can be seen, Fig. 3, if "plastic" FAD is used the 
assessment points are still in the safe region. Let us also 
notice that relatively low KI is a minor problem, because 
curve shifts right to the region where plasticity can sustain 
Sr larger than 1, Fig. 3, while relatively high KI could 
present a major problem, at least according to the diagram, 
because the point would shift outside limit curve. Anyhow, 
this is theory, but in practice residual stresses, which are 
responsible for relatively high KI value, probably would 
transform in plastic strain. Therefore, more sophisticated 
analysis is needed if residual stresses are significant, 
because FADs tend to be over-conservative.  
 
 
Figure 3 Failure Assessment Diagram  
 
Table 3 Position of points (1-5) in Risk matrix 
 
Consequence category 











≤0.2      
0.2-0.4     Point 3 & 5 
0.4-0.6      
0.6-0.8     Point 2 
0.8-1.0     Point 1 & 4 
 
4 RISK MATRIX AND RISK BASED ANALYSIS 
 
After defining probability, it is a simple matter to make 
the risk matrix, combining consequences with probabili-
ties. According to the description given in table 1, explosion 
of the pressure vessel, considered here, corresponds to the 
category 5, because of potentially catastrophic scenario, as 
defined in [3, 4]. As one can see, points 1 and 4 have the 
highest risk, then comes point 2, whereas points 3 and 5 have 
moderate risk. In this way one can follow influences of RS, 
OP and/or other factors. As an illustration, one can say that 
OP shifts risk from high (point 2) to very high (point 4), 




It is shown, using different approaches, that the effect 
of RS is overestimated in "classical" FAD, even though it 
is not taken into account in evaluation of Sr. Anyhow, its 
detrimental effect is more or less lost also for Kr, if material 
is capable of plastic straining. This is the case with 
structural steels, including their weldments, even in the 
presence of cracks.  
On the other hand side, detrimental effect of over-
pressure has been shown both by FAD and by using risk 
based matrix, combining probabilities, obtained by FAD, 
and consequences. 
Finally, the effect of delamination has been also shown 
as detrimental, but only if it is simultaneous with other 
effects and large cracks. Future research should focus on 
more detailed analysis of interaction between all analysed 
effects, especially in the case of cold rolled steel plates 
used for old pressure vessel, since delamination in this case 
can make fatal contribution to catastrophic failure, as 
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